Abstract. Tripartite (Diffie-Hellman) Key Exchange (3KE), introduced by Joux (ANTS-IV 2000), represents today the only known class of group key exchange protocols, in which computation of unauthenticated session keys requires one round and proceeds with minimal computation and communication overhead. The first one-round authenticated 3KE version that preserved the unique efficiency properties of the original protocol and strengthened its security towards resilience against leakage of ephemeral (session-dependent) secrets was proposed recently by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu (ICISC 2009).
Introduction
Key Exchange (KE) protocols are crucial research topics with direct practical applications. Although KE was introduced back in 1976 [17] , it was not until 1993 when Bellare and Rogaway [7] made the first step towards capturing the security requirements for these protocols in a formal way. Research efforts on provable security in KE protocols, in the public key setting, focused on two-party KE (2KE), e.g. [14, 24, 15, 25, 32, 37, 16] , and group KE (GKE), e.g. [10, 29, 22, 12, 31, 19] , reaching out to other flavors such as password-based solutions [8, 6, 9, 3] or flexible combinations of GKE and 2KE [30, 1] . The security notion, shared by most KE flavors, takes its roots in [7] and is called authenticated key exchange (AKE) security. Although AKE-security has been modeled for different types of adversaries, the common idea for secure key exchange is indistinguishability of a test session key from a randomly chosen one.
as to add authentication (without ephemeral key leakage-resilience) to unauthenticated KE protocols [22, 13] or to obtain optional insider security [21, 11, 19] in GKE protocols. Yet another interesting direction is to search for sufficient conditions for achieving a security goal. Only recently, and for 2KE protocols only, sufficient conditions for ephemeral key-leakage resilience (in the eCK model [25] ) have been identified by Fujioka and Suzuki [18] . Their key observation is that many eCK-secure implicitly authenticated 2KE protocols derive session keys from a shared secret group element of the form g z , where g is the generator of a cycling group of prime order q and the exponent z ∈ Z * q can often be represented as a function that "mixes" products of static and ephemeral private keys. The authors introduced the concept of admissible polynomials over Z q to describe which representations of z admit AKE-secure 2KE protocols in the eCK model, by offering a general reduction algorithm to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) [35] problem (in the random oracle model). They could explain constructions of existing eCK-secure 2KE protocols and design new more efficient protocols. The beauty of their approach is that instead of designing an eCK-secure 2KE protocol from scratch it suffices to come up with a set of admissible polynomials.
Our Contributions. We identify sufficient conditions for ephemeral key-leakage resilience of (implicitly authenticated) one-round 3KE protocols, that is conditions under which the protocol can achieve AKE-security (with forward secrecy) from [31] . Technically, we build on the work from [18] and adopt their notion of admissible polynomials. The main difference to the 2KE case is that we work with three parties and that one-round 3KE protocols generally require bilinear maps, and hence our definition of "admissible" is different. In particular, our admissible polynomials are of degree three and involve six variables as opposed to polynomials of degree two and four variables from [18] . We show that our conditions on such polynomials are sufficient by providing a generic framework for the design of implicitly authenticated one-round 3KE protocols with ephemeral key-leakage resilience and forward secrecy in the model from [31] under the gap Bilinear DiffieHellman (gap BDH) assumption [5] in the random oracle model. This framework explains the 3KE protocol from [31] and gives rise to many further 3KE protocols, all of which are resilient to the leakage of ephemeral session secrets and enjoy forward secrecy.
The Model and Security Definitions
We recall the security model from [31] , termed g-eCK model. This model extends strongly-authenticated key exchange model for two-party protocols from [32] to the group setting and it is described using notations and terminology of the state-of-the-art GKE model [19] .
Protocol Participants and Initialization. Let U := {U 1 , . . . , U N } be a set of potential protocol participants and each user U i ∈ U is assumed to hold a static private/public key pair (s i , S i ) generated by some algorithm Gen(1 κ ) on a security parameter 1 κ during the initialization phase. Unfortunately, these restrictions are not sufficient for our purpose since Π s U becomes immediately unfresh if the adversary gets involved into the protocol execution via a Send query after having learned the static key s U * of some user U * those instance participates in the same session as Π s U . The recent model in [12] defines freshness using the additional AddUser and StateReveal queries as follows. According to [12] , an instance Π s U that has accepted is fresh if none of the following is true: Although this definition is already stronger than the one in [22] it is still insufficient for the main reason that it excludes the leakage of ephemeral secrets of instances in the period between the protocol invocation and acceptance. Also this definition of freshness does not model key compromise impersonation attacks.
The recent update of the freshness notion in [19] addressed the lack of key compromise impersonation resilience. In particular, it modifies the above condition (3) . This condition should allow the adversary to obtain static private keys of users prior to the execution of the attacked session while requiring its benign behavior with respect to the corrupted user during the attack.
Yet, this freshness requirement still prevents the adversary from obtaining ephemeral secrets of participants during the attacked session. What is needed is a freshness condition that would allow the adversary to corrupt users and reveal the ephemeral secrets used by their instances in the attacked session at will for the only exception that it does not obtain both the static key s U * and the ephemeral secrets used by the corresponding instance of U * ; otherwise security can no longer be guaranteed. In the following we define freshness taking into account all the previously mentioned problems. Note that since U ∈ pid s U and since the notion of partnering is self-inclusive Condition 3 prevents the simultaneous corruption of static and ephemeral secrets for the corresponding instance Π s U as well. In case when users are allowed to own two partnering instances i.e., they can initiate protocols with themselves the last condition should be modified to say that the number of instances of U equals the number of times U appears in pid s U . Note also that the above definition captures key-compromise impersonation resilience through Condition 4: A is allowed to corrupt participants of the test session in advance but then must ensure that instances of such participants have been honestly participating in the test session. In this way we exclude the trivial break of security where A reveals static keys of users prior to the test session and then actively impersonates those users during the session. On the other hand, as long as A remains benign with respect to such users their instances will still be considered as fresh. 
Definition 1. An accepted instance

Definition 2 (g-eCK Security
and denote with Adv ake P (κ) the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries A. We say that a GKE protocol P provides g-eCK security if this advantage is negligible.
Sufficient Condition for Secure Tripartite Protocols
We identify now sufficient conditions for a 3KE protocol to satisfy g-eCK security from Definition 2. Technically, we build upon [18] and their notion of admissible polynomials. We extend definition of admissible polynomials to account for the specifics of 3KE protocols and then present a framework for the generic design of g-eCK secure one-round 3KE protocols out of those polynomials.
Admissible Polynomials
We define admissible polynomials in Definition 3 with respect to multivariate polynomials with six variables over Z q and state three conditions that, as we will see, are sufficient for building g-eCK secure one-round 3KE protocols. The first condition from Definition 3 says that each term of polynomial p (i) has degree three and that either u 0 or u 1 , either v 0 or v 1 , and either w 0 or w 1 appear in each term. The second condition says that there exist four polynomials
such that the four corresponding vectors of the coefficients of their terms containing a specific variable, are linearly independent. The third condition says that for each polynomial p (i) the corresponding polynomial, which consists of the terms containing specific variables, is a product of three linear polynomials.
Definition 3 (Admissible Polynomials). We say m (m ≥ 4) polynomials
.., m) are admissible if the following conditions are satisfied.
For any i (= 1, ..., m), the following condition holds
where d
are linearly independent, and for any β (= 0, 1), there exist distinct indices
are linearly independent, and for any γ (= 0, 1), there exist distinct indices
are linearly independent. 3. We denote 
In Section 3.2 we construct a g-eCK secure 3KE protocol from admissible polynomials, where parties compute m shared secrets ..., m) . The above three conditions will be utilized in the security proof of the designed protocol. Roughly, the first condition ensures that each user is able to compute the shared secret group elements. The second condition enables the simulator to extract a BDH solution from the challenge test session. The third conditions ensures simulator can verify that shared secret group elements are correctly formed. We refer to the proof of Theorem 1 for further details and provide in the following some examples of admissible polynomials.
Example 1
Example 2
Example 3. This example essentially explains the construction behind the oneround 3KE protocol by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu [31] .
where D, E, F = 1.
Example 4
p (1) = (u 0 + u 1 )(v 0 + v 1 )(w 0 + w 1 ) , p (2) = u 0 v 1 w 1 + u 1 v 0 w 0 , p (3) = u 1 v 0 w 1 + u 0 v 1 w 0 , p (4) = u 1 v 1 w 0 + u 0 v 0 w 1 .
Proposed 3KE Protocol
We now propose the 3KE protocol Π p (1) ,...,p (m) constructed from admissible polynomials p (i) (i = 1, . . . , m). We then prove in Theorem 1 that if polynomials p (i) (i = 1, . . . , m) satisfy the conditions of admissible polynomials, the proposed 3KE protocol Π p (1) ,...,p (m) is g-eCK secure, i.e., we provide a sufficient condition for building g-eCK secure 3KE protocols. The proposed 3KE protocol Π p (1) ,...,p (m) is described as follows. Let p (i) (i = 1, . . . , m) be admissible polynomials. Let κ be the security parameter. Let G and G T be cyclic groups of prime order q. Let e : G × G → G T be a non-degenerate bilinear map, called pairing, from group G × G to group G T . Let g and g T = e(g, g) be a generator of G and G T , respectively. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ be cryptographic hash function modeled as a random oracle. Let P be the protocol identifier of the protocol Π p (1) ,...,p (m) .
For a user U A , we set U A 's static and ephemeral keys A 0 = g a0 and A 1 = g a1 , respectively, and the lowercase letters are the private keys.
In the description, users U A , U B , and U C communicate with each other, and compute the session key.
1. U A selects a random ephemeral private key a 1 ∈ U Z q , computes the ephemeral public key A 1 = g a1 , stores ephemeral private key a 1 as state information, and broadcasts (P, (U A , U B , U C ), U A , A 1 ) to U B and U C . 2. U B selects a random ephemeral private key b 1 ∈ U Z q , computes the ephemeral public key B 1 = g b1 , stores ephemeral private key b 1 as state information, and broadcasts (P, (U A , U B , U C ), U B , B 1 ) to U C and U A .
3. U C selects a random ephemeral private key c 1 ∈ U Z q , computes the ephemeral public key C 1 = g c1 , stores ephemeral private key c 1 as state information, and broadcasts (P, (U A , U B , U C ), U C , C 1 ) to U A and U B .
Upon receiving (P, (U
, and completes the session.
All users U A , U B , and U C compute the same shared secrets
and so compute the same session key K. The outlined 3KE protocol Π p (1) ,...,p (m) requires exactly m shared secrets, 4 pairing operations at most, and 4m+1 exponential operations at most (including the exponentiation for the ephemeral public key).
Security
For the security of the proposed protocol, we need 4 the gap Bilinear DiffieHellman (gap BDH) assumption [5] described below. Let BCDH : x ) and returns bit 1 if uvw = x mod q and bit 0 otherwise. An adversary A is given input U, V, W ∈ U G selected uniformly random and oracle access to BDDH(·, ·, ·, ·) oracle, and tries to compute BCDH(U, V, W ). For adversary A, we define advantage
where the probability is taken over the choices of U, V, W and A's random tape. 
Definition 4 (gap BDH assumption
user U B , who knows secret keys b 0 , b 1 , can compute shared secrets
and user U C , who knows secret keys c 0 , c 1 , can compute shared secrets
The gap BDH solver S extracts the answer g uvw T of an instance (U = g u , V = g v , W = g w ) of the gap BDH problem using adversary A. For instance, we assume the case that test session sid * , owner of which is user U A , has no partnered sessions sid * , owners of which are users U B and U C , adversary A is given a 0 , and adversary A does not obtain a 1 , b 0 and c 0 from the condition of the freshness. In this case, solver S can perfectly simulate StaticKeyReveal query by selecting random a 0 and setting A 0 = g a0 , and solver S embeds the instance as H(Z 1 , . . . , Z m , P, U A , A 0 , A 1 , U B , B 0 , B 1 , U C , C 0 , C 1 ) query, solver S must check that the shared secrets Z i (i = 1, . . . , m) are correctly formed, and if so return session key K that is consistent with the previously answered SessionKeyReveal (P, U X , U A , A 0 , A 1 , U B , B 0 , B 1 , U 
Conclusion
We presented a sufficient condition for constructing one-round ephemeral keyleakage resilient 3KE protocols where parties are equipped with a static public key and an ephemeral public key, each comprised of only one group element, and where key derivation is performed via a single call to the hash function, modeled as a random oracle. Technically, the proposed 3KE protocol can be seen as a combination of several two-dimensional versions of the original (unauthenticated) tripartite key exchange protocol from [20] . The protocol gives rise to a framework for the design of efficient ephemeral key-leakage resilient oneround 3KE protocols in the model from [31] by choosing different admissible polynomials. The amount of work for proving security of all those protocols essentially reduces to proving that chosen polynomials are admissible according to the conditions stated in this paper.
